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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY LEE OLIVER, 
Petitioner/ Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Respondent. 
Case No. 20050090-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was certiorari improvidently granted to review the merits of 
petitioner's guilty plea challenge when the post-conviction court dismissed the 
petition as untimely, the court of appeals affirmed that decision, and this court 
did not issue a writ of certiorari to review that issue? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. Alternatively, did petitioner's taking of prescription medication prior to 
pleading guilty render his plea unknowing or involuntary when the record of the 
plea colloquy demonstrated that (1) both the trial court and defense counsel 
asked about the medication's purpose; (2) petitioner was asked five times 
whether the medication affected his ability to think or understand the 
proceedings; (3) each time, petitioner affirmed that the medication did not affect 
his thinking or understanding; and (4) petitioner's demeanor and responses 
during the plea colloquy were consistent with his assertion that he could think 
clearly and that he understood the proceedings. 
Standard of Review, "'On certiorari, [this Court will] review the court of 
appeals'[s] decision for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference.'" 
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 10,116 P.3d 305 (quoting State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 
UT16,1 7, 86 P.3d 742). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case does not require interpretation of any constitutional provision, 
statute, or rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 10 November 1994 petitioner pled guilty to one count of murder, a first 
degree felony. R. 156. On 20 January 1995 the trial court sentenced petitioner to 
serve five years to life in the Utah State Prison. R. 163. 
2 
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On 2 September 2002 petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
R. 163. He alleged several grounds for relief, including that "his plea was 
invalidly entered because he was under the effects of Nortriptaline, a 
psychotropic drug, which left him 'in a stupor' and he 'did not comprehend the 
nature of the proceedings." R. 163. 
The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. R. 165, 167 
(a complete copy of the post-conviction court's findings, conclusions, and order 
is attached as Addendum B). It concluded that its ruling on the timeliness issue 
was an "adequate and independent ground" for dismissing the petition. R. 165. 
Alternatively, the post-conviction court found that each of petitioner's claims 
failed as a matter of law. R. 165-67. 
The court of appeals summarily affirmed the post-conviction court's ruling 
in an unpublished, memorandum decision. See Oliver v. State, 2004 UT App 360 
(unpublished, memorandum decision) (a copy of this decision is attached as 
Addendum A). The opinion affirmed both the dismissal of the petition as 
untimely, and the alternative ruling denying petitioner's claims on their merits. 
See id. 
Although petitioner sought review of the entire court of appeals' opinion, 
this Court granted a writ of certiorari "only as to the following issue: Whether 
disclosure of a defendant's taking of medication during a plea colloquy requires 
3 
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further investigation by the sentencing court/7 R. 197. This Court set this matter 
to be heard with State v. Beckstead, which raises a similar issue. R. 197. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 23 June 1994 petitioner shot and killed his wife. R. 156. He pled guilty 
to one count of murder, a first degree felony. R. 156. 
Petitioner executed an affidavit during the plea hearing. R. 59-65,156. The 
affidavit stated, " I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication 
or intoxicants which impair my judgment/' R. 63. It also stated, "I believe 
myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of understanding 
the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea." R. 63, 157. Petitioner's defense counsel, Mr. 
Gilbert Athay, also certified that he believed that petitioner was "mentally and 
physically competent." R. 64,157. Petitioner assured the trial court that he had 
read the plea affidavit and reviewed it with Mr. Athay. R. 68,157. 
During the plea colloquy, the following exchange took place: 
[THE COURT]: Are you presently under the influence of any 
alcohol or drugs of any kind? 
[PETITIONER]: No, sir. 
[THE COURT]: Have you taken anything in the last twenty-four 
hours? 
4 
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[PETITIONER]: Only some pills over in the ja i l - telpolin-
[THE COURT]: What is the -
[PETITIONER]: To help me sleep. 
MR. ATHAY: They affect your ability to think? 
[PETITIONER]: I don't think so. 
[MR. ATHAY]: They affect you ability to make decisions? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
[MR. ATHAY]: Do you understand what we're doing here today? 
[PETITIONER]: Yeah. Yeah. 
[MR. ATHAY]: You and I have spoken about this plea on numerous 
occasions, have we not? 
[PETITIONER]: Uh-huh. 
[MR. ATHAY]: And at any time have the pills affected your 
judgment in deciding whether to enter this plea? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you were under the influence of 
these pills right now? You can understand what it is that I have told 
you? 
[PETITIONER]: No, I understand. I understand. 
[THE COURT]: Do you have any questions about theses 
proceedings so far, Mr. Oliver? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
MR. ATHAY: May I ask a couple of other questions? 
5 
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THE COURT: Yes, uh-huh~ 
MR. ATHAY: They give you these to control mood swings that you 
have? 
MR. OLIVER: I guess that 's-I told them I couldn't sleep so they 
gave me that stuff. I was depressed. 
[MR. ATHAY]: That been as a rule what occurred in this case? 
[PETITIONER]: Yeah. 
[MR. ATHAY]: And the depression and lack of sleep not something 
you were concerned about prior to this event occur [r]ing? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
[MR. ATHAY]: And those pills were given to alter the moods that 
you had found yourself in; is that correct? 
[PETITIONER]: Yes. 
R. 75-76 (a complete copy of the plea hearing transcript is attached as Addendum 
Q . 
Following the plea colloquy, the trial court found "that the plea has been 
freely, voluntarily and knowingly entered." R. 76. The trial court based its 
finding "on the [petitioner's] responses to the court's questions and observations 
of the [petitioner]." R. 76. 
The post-conviction court (the same court that conducted the plea 
colloquy) reviewed the record of the colloquy and found that petitioner 
6 
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"responded directly, coherently, and cogently to each of the Court's questions/' 
R. 157 (Add. B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted because the judgment below rests on an independent ground that is not 
at issue. The post-conviction court denied petitioner relief on two independent 
grounds: (1) the petition was untimely, and (2) petitioner's claims failed on their 
merits. The Court of appeals affirmed both rulings. This Court declined to 
review the timeliness issue. That decision was correct because petitioner sought 
certiorari review of that issue on an improper ground. This Court did grant 
certiorari to review the merits of petitioner's guilty plea challenge. However, 
any further review of that claim is unnecessary because the claim was brought in 
an untimely petition. 
II. Alternatively, the court of appeals correctly affirmed the post-
conviction court's ruling that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his 
medication rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary. Other courts to 
address this issue recognize that while information about the type, amount, and 
timing of previously ingested medication may be helpful, that information is no 
substitute for a trial court's direct inquiry about how the medication is affecting 
the defendant's state of mind at the time of the plea, and the court's objective 
7 
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assessment of demeanor and responsiveness during a thorough plea colloquy. 
This approach is consistent with this Court's direction that an adequate guilty 
plea colloquy does not require a formalistic ritual or recitation of scripted 
questions. 
Petitioner's repeated assurances that the medication did not affect his 
ability to enter a guilty plea, coupled with his lucid performance during the plea 
colloquy, established that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
ARGUMENT 
L CERTIORARI WAS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED TO 
REVIEW PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA CHALLENGE 
BECAUSE THE CLAIM WAS BROUGHT IN AN UNTIMELY 
POST-CONVICTION PETITION 
This Court may dismiss a writ of certiorari on the ground that it was 
improvidently granted. See State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) 
(dismissing a writ of certiorari as improvident when the issue was moot). 
Certiorari is improvidently granted when, among other things, the "decision of 
the question upon which certiorari was granted . . . prove [s] unnecessary since 
the judgment below was clearly correct on another ground/' Israel Pagan Estate v. 
Capitol Thrift & Loan, 771 P.2d 1032, 1032 (Utah 1989) (Howe, J., dissenting) 
(citing The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959). That is the 
case here. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The post-conviction court denied relief on two independent grounds: (1) 
the petition was untimely, and (2) petitioner's claims, including his guilty plea 
challenge, failed on their merits. R. 167 (Add. B). The post-conviction court 
specifically found that its ruling that the petition was untimely was an adequate 
and independent ground for dismissing the petition. R. 165, 167. The court of 
appeals affirmed both of the post-conviction court's rulings. Oliver v. State, 2004 
UT App 360 (unpublished memorandum decision) (Add. A). Petitioner sought 
certiorari review of both issues. However, this Court granted the petition for 
writ of certiorari, "only as to the following issue: Whether disclosure of a 
defendant's taking of medication during a plea colloquy requires further 
investigation by the sentencing court." R. 197. 
This Court correctly declined to review the statute of limitations issue 
because petitioner did not properly seek certiorari review of that issue. In his 
petition for writ of certiorari, petitioner argued that the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act's statute of limitations was an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus. However, petitioner did not raise a suspension clause 
claim below. Rather, he argued that the statute of limitations could not apply 
based on prior precedent, and also because he was sentenced before the statute 
was enacted. R. 107-08. Therefore, petitioner sought certiorari review of his 
statute of limitations claim on an improper basis. See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 
9 
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428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("issues not raised in the court of appeals may be raised on 
certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time out of the court of appeals' 
decision"). 
This Court's refusal to review the statute of limitations issue renders 
unnecessary any further review of petitioner's case. The post-conviction court's 
ruling that the petition was untimely, and the court of appeals' affirmation of 
that ruling, is dispositive of petitioner's case. Because the judgment below is 
"correct on another ground," certiorari review of petitioner's guilty plea 
challenge is improvident. See Israel Pagan Estate, 771 P.2d at 1032 (Howe, J., 
dissenting). 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT'S PLEA COLLOQUY 
ADEQUATELY INQUIRED INTO PETITIONER'S ABILITY 
TO ENTER A KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA 
When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court bears the 
burden "to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing 
and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived 
his or her constitutional rights.'" State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 11,114 P.3d 569 
(quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,111, 22 P.3d 1242). The ultimate objective "is 
to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic 
consequences of their decision to plead guilty/7 Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ^ 11. 
10 
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This Court has counseled that this "goal should not be overshadowed or 
undermined by formalistic ritual/7 Id. Therefore, a trial court is not required to 
"follow a 'particular script'" when conducting a guilty plea colloquy. Corwell, 
2005 UT 28 at U 12 (citing Visser, 2000 UT 88 at f 13). 
When a trial court learns during a plea colloquy that a defendant is taking 
medication, the court "has a duty to inquire into the defendant's capacity to enter 
a guilty plea." United States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Or. 2000) 
(citing Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States, 181 F.3d 164, 166 (1st Or. 1999)). "The 
critical question is whether the drugs —if they have a capacity to impair the 
defendant's ability to plead—have in fact done so on this occasion." Id. 
The First Circuit has suggested that when courts undertake this inquiry 
"[t]he better practice would be to identify which drugs a defendant is taking, 
how recently they have been taken and in what quantity, and (so far as possible) 
the purpose and consequences of the drugs in question." Savinon-Acosta, 232 
F.3d at 268. Nevertheless, "there is certainly no settled rule that a hearing cannot 
proceed unless precise names and quantities of drugs have been identified." Id. 
at 269. 
The sufficiency of a trial court's inquiry ultimately turns on whether the 
court adequately inquired about the medication's effects on the defendant's 
mental state at the time of the plea. See Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 53 (1st 
11 
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Cir. 2001); Savinon-Acosta, 232 F 3d at 268; Miranda-Gonzalez, 181 F.3d at 165. The 
First Circuit has recognized that "[c]ourts have commonly relied on the 
defendant's own assurance (and assurances from counsel) that the defendant's 
mind is clear" especially when "the defendant's own performance in the course 
of a colloquy . . . confirm[s] . . . his assurances." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. 
Hence, although the First Circuit "would have been more comfortable if the 
district court had been able to ascertain the name of the tranquilizer and the 
quantity" that Savinon-Acosta had taken on the morning of his change of plea 
hearing, the trial court "did determine the purpose of the medicine and then 
asked specifically, 'Does that medicine in any way affect your ability to 
understand the conversation we're having this morning?'" Id. Savinon-Acosta's 
own assurance that it did not—"No. No. I understand perfectly" — together with 
his lucid performance during the plea colloquy, was sufficient to establish the 
validity of his guilty plea. Id. 
Similarly, in Cody, the First Circuit suggested that "the [district] court 
might have probed further into the purpose and effects of lithium" which the 
defendant was taking, presumably because he suffered from post-traumatic 
stress syndrome. 249 F.3d at 53. Nevertheless, the district court "at least 
conducted the minimum inquiry required" because it twice asked Cody whether 
the medication "affected his ability to make reasoned decisions." Id. Moreover, 
12 
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Cody's appearance and demeanor supported his assurances that the medication 
did not impair his understanding of the proceedings. Id. at 53 n.5. 
Other courts have reached similar results. See United States v. Browning, 61 
F.3d 752, 754 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Browning's guilty plea where he assured 
court that his medication "had not" "affected [his] ability to think or 
comprehend" and record was devoid of evidence "that his ability to enter a 
knowing and voluntary plea was affected by the medications"); United States v. 
Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187 (8th Cir.) (rejecting Vaughan's claim that his mental 
condition prevented him from entering a knowing guilty plea where Vaughan 
had "denied that he was under the influence of 'anything, medication or 
otherwise' that would make it difficult for him to understand why he was 
pleading guilty," and where Vaughan's "sworn statements were lucid, articulate, 
and inconsistent with his claim that he did not enter a knowing and intelligent 
plea"), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1094 (1994); United States v. Dolman, 994 F.2d 537, 538-
539 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding Dalman's guilty plea where, even though he was 
"taking four different types of pills," Dalman assured court that he understood 
what was happening "'right now'"); Froistad v. State, 641 N.W.2d 86, 95-96 (N.D. 
2002) (upholding guilty plea where Froistad assured trial court that prescribed 
medication he was taking did not affect his "thinking faculties" and "nothing in 
the record [] indicate [d] that Froistad was confused or unaware of what was 
13 
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taking place during the proceeding"); State v. Mink, 805 N.E.2d 1064, 1076-1077 
(Ohio 2004) (upholding guilty plea where Mink assured trial court "that [his] 
medication had no effect on his ability to understand the court's proceedings"); 
State v. Ries, 849 R2d 184, 186 (Mont 1993) (upholding guilty plea where Ries 
denied taking any medication "at the moment" and affirmed that his "mind" 
was "clear"). 
A trial court's inquiry is insufficient when it entirely fails to make any 
inquiry about a medication's effects on the defendant's ability to enter a plea. 
For example, in United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43, 47 (3rd Cir. 1987), the Third 
Circuit reversed when, after learning that the pleading defendant had recently 
taken drugs, "the [district] court failed to inquire further or even acknowledge 
that it was aware of this evidence." Similarly, in United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 
F.2d 588, 591, 596 (1st Cir. 1991), the trial court learned the names of the 
medications and the reason defendant was taking them, but did not ask "what 
effects, if any such medications might be likely to have on [the defendant's] clear-
headedness." Likewise, in United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 563 (4th Cir. 
1999), Damon stated that he was taking an antidepressant because of a recent 
suicide attempt, but the district court "did not ask any follow-up questions about 
whether the medication had any actual effect on Damon's ability to enter a 
competent and voluntary plea." 
14 
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The inquiries in Cole, Parra-Ibanez, and Damon were not insufficient 
because the trial courts failed to ascertain the precise name, dosage, or effects of 
the medications. Rather, they were insufficient because the trial courts failed to 
ask whether the medications affected the defendant's ability to think and 
comprehend during the plea colloquy. Thus, the primary concern reflected in all 
of the above cases is not so much with the "precise names and quantities of 
drugs" consumed, but rather with whether the record supports a finding that the 
defendant understood the proceedings. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. 
Courts generally recognize that while information about the type, amount, 
and timing of previously ingested medication may be enlightening in some 
circumstances, it is no substitute for a trial court's direct inquiry about how the 
medication affects the defendant's state of mind at the time of the plea, and the 
court's objective assessment of demeanor and responsiveness during a thorough 
plea colloquy. This approach is consistent with this Court's counsel that the 
purpose of a guilty plea colloquy "should not be overshadowed or undermined 
by formalistic ritual," or a "particular script" of questions. See Visser, 2000 UT 88 
at If 11. 
In State v. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, |^f 1-3, 100 P.3d 267 cert, granted, 
109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), the court of appeals addressed the sufficiency of a trial 
court's colloquy with a defendant who had been drinking on the morning of his 
15 
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plea hearing. Beckstead filed a motion to withdraw his plea, alleging in part that 
he was intoxicated when he pled guilty. Id. at f^ 4. The trial court denied the 
motion but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's plea 
colloquy was inadequate. Id. at f^ 11. The court of appeals reasoned that when 
the trial court learned that Beckstead had been drinking, its duty to strictly 
comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure required it to 
specifically ask about "the amount of alcohol that Beckstead had consumed [and] 
the amount of time that had elapsed since his last drink/' Id. at f^f 10-11. 
This Court has ordered that this case will be heard in conjunction with the 
petition in Beckstead.1 R. 197. Although the issues in the two cases are similar, 
the cases' procedural postures are not. Beckstead directly challenged his guilty 
plea through a motion to withdraw. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338 at f^ 4. 
Therefore, to prevail, Beckstead had to demonstrate that the trial court failed to 
strictly comply with Rule 11 in accepting his guilty plea. Id. at f 6. In contrast, 
petitioner collaterally challenged his guilty plea through a petition for post-
conviction relief. R. 1, 7. For petitioner to prevail, he must demonstrate that his 
"conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the United States Constitution or 
1
 Although Beckstead was issued fifteen days before the opinion in 
petitioner's case, the court of appeals did not apply or reference Beckstead. See 
Oliver, 2004 UT App 360 (Add. A). For the reasons explained in this brief, and in 
the State's briefs in Beckstead, the court of appeals' opinion in Beckstead should be 
reversed, while the opinion in petitioner's case should be affirmed. 
16 
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Utah Constitution." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West 2004). 
"[Compliance with rule 11 is not constitutionally required." Salazar v. Warden, 
852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in original). Therefore, unlike Beckstead, 
petitioner "must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of 
rule 11; he . . . must show that the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and 
voluntary." Id. at 992. The court of appeals correctly held that he failed to do so. 
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the post-conviction court's finding 
that petitioner had not demonstrated that his medication rendered him unable to 
enter a knowing a voluntary guilty plea. During the plea colloquy, the trial court 
asked petitioner whether he had "taken anything in the last twenty-four hours." 
R. 75 (Add. C). Petitioner replied: "Only some pills over in the jail—telpolin—." 
R. 75. Both the trial court and defense counsel then asked about the medication's 
purpose, which petitioner explained was to treat his depression and help him 
sleep. R. 75, 76. Both the trial court and defense counsel then asked, in five 
different ways, whether the medication affected petitioner's ability to think or 
understand the proceedings. R. 75-76. Each time, petitioner stated that the 
medication did not affect his ability to think and that he understood what was 
happening. R. 75-76. When asked whether he understood the purpose of the 
plea hearing, petitioner responded, "Yeah. Yeah." R. 75. When the trial court 
asked whether petitioner felt like he was "under the influence of these pills right 
17 
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now" and whether he could understand what the trial court had told him, 
petitioner replied, "No, I understand. I understand." R. 75. 
Although petitioner could not remember the exact name of the medication 
he had taken, the trial court did learn the purpose of the medication and that 
petitioner had taken it within twenty-four hours of the plea. R. 75-76. Most 
importantly, both the trial court and defense counsel repeatedly asked whether 
the medication affected petitioner's ability to think or to understand the 
proceedings and petitioner repeatedly stated that it did not. R. 75-76. 
Moreover, petitioner's lucid performance during the rest of the plea colloquy 
supported his assurances that he understood the proceedings. R. 68-77. In fact, 
the trial court found petitioner's plea to be "voluntarily and knowingly entered . 
. . based on [petitioner's] responses to the court's questions and observations of 
the [petitioner]." R. 76. 
"The mere fact that [petitioner] took potentially mood-altering medication 
is not sufficient to vitiate his plea.'" Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States, 181 F.3d 
164, 165 (1st Or. 1999) (quoting United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1537 (1* 
Cir. 1989)). "Rather, [petitioner] must show 'that the medication affected his 
rationality.'" Id. 
Petitioner did not demonstrate that his medication affected his rationality. 
As in Savinon-Acosta and Cody, petitioner's assurances that the medication did 
18 
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not affect his ability to enter a guilty plea, coupled with his lucid performance 
during the plea colloquy, sufficiently establish that his plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. Savinon-Acotsa, 232 F.3d at 268-69; Cody, 249 F.3d at 52-53. 
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly affirmed the post-conviction court's 
alternative holding denying petitioner's guilty plea challenge on its merits. 
Petitioner argues that the trial court should have held a separate hearing 
and received expert testimony regarding the medication he was taking. Pet'r Br. 
at 1. On the contrary, "practical judgments [about a medication's effect on a 
defendant] can usually be made[,]" and "[c]ourts have commonly relied on the 
defendant's own assurance (and assurances from counsel) that the defendant's 
mind is clear" together with "defendant's own performance in the course of a 
colloquy." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 268-69. 
Petitioner also argues that the trial court was required to conduct a 
competency examination. Pet'r Br. at 3. However, the issue of the need for a 
competency hearing was not raised below and was not included in this Court's 
order granting the writ of certiorari. R. 197. In any event, as explained above, 
the record of petitioner's plea colloquy demonstrates that petitioner was 
competent to enter his guilty plea. 
Finally, petitioner relies on an internet printout allegedly describing 
Nortriptaline's affects, and also on his county jail medical records. Pet'r Br. at 7. 
19 
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He attaches these documents to his brief as attachments four and five, 
respectively. The Court should strike these attachments because they were never 
presented to the post-conviction court and are therefore not part of the record. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) & (11) (requiring that citations in the argument 
portion of a brief, and the information included in the addendum, must be part 
of the record on appeal). An appellate court's "review is of course limited to the 
evidence contained in the record on appeal." Wilderness Building Systems v. 
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1985); see also, Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 
843, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("appellate courts of this state do not consider new 
evidence on appeal"). Because petitioner's attachments four and five are not part 
of the record, this Court should strike the documents, and all arguments based 
thereon, from petitioner's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should either dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted or affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
Respectfully submitted ^>L August 2005. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 15 2004 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Gary Lee Oliver, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040320-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 15, 2004) 
2004 UT App 360 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys Gary Lee Oliver, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. Ballard, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on its own motion for summary 
affirmance on the basis that the issues presented on appeal are 
so insubstantial as to not merit further consideration by the 
court. See Utah R. App. P. 10. The district court determined 
that the petition was untimely and that, even if it had been 
timely, the State was entitled to summary judgment. 
The petition was determined to be untimely because the one-
year statute of limitations on post-conviction remedies became 
effective on April 29, 1996. Oliver was sentenced on January 20, 
1997, after the statute of limitations became effective. 
According to the district court, Oliver had until April 29, 1997 
to file a post-conviction petition. He did not file until 
September 3, 2002. The court further found that Oliver did not 
meet the "interests of justice" exception to the statute of 
limitations. 
Despite the finding that the petition was untimely, the 
district court went on to address whether, assuming the petition 
had been timely filed, the State would be entitled to summary 
judgment. Oliver's claims were that: he was under the influence 
of a psychotropic drug, given in the jail, that impaired his 
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ability to understand the change of plea; he was denied his right 
of appeal; the State failed to fulfill the terms of the plea 
agreement; and he received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
the plea and sentencing. 
The district court, after reviewing the plea colloquy, 
determined that Oliver understood the proceedings. The court 
also determined that Oliver had not been deprived of his right to 
counsel because he had no right to appeal the sentence on the 
ground that his plea was invalid. 
The district court determined that the State had fulfilled 
the terms of the plea agreement. The sentencing court declined 
to follow the recommendation of reducing the conviction, but did 
follow the recommendation not to impose a gun enhancement onto 
the five to life sentence. Further, Oliver was informed at the 
change of plea that the court is not bound to follow any 
recommendation. 
The court also determined that counsel was not ineffective. 
Counsel correctly informed Oliver that he could only move to 
withdraw his plea within thirty days of entry of the plea. This 
was the state of the law at the time Oliver was advised. The 
court also indicated that Oliver failed to demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced even if counsel had been ineffective. 
Oliver has not demonstrated that these findings were 
erroneous. Oliver claims that to impose the statute of 
limitations on post-conviction petitions on him would be 
retroactive application of the statute. However, the statute 
went into effect before his sentencing and, therefore, is not 
retroactively imposed. 
Oliver selects one phrase of the prosecutor's argument at 
the sentencing and change of plea hearing to support his argument 
that uhe prosecutor failed to fulfill the terms of the plea 
agreement. Review of the entire transcript shows that the 
prosecutor did fulfil the terms of the agreement, which was to 
recommend that Oliver be sentenced a degree lower with imposition 
of a gun enhancement, or, if Oliver was sentenced to five to 
life, to recommend life in prison with no gun enhancement. 
The district court was correct in determining that Oliver 
had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. Oliver was 
correctly advised of the state of the law regarding withdrawal of 
a plea as it existed at the time he was advised. Moreover, 
Oliver has not demonstrated, as he claims, that counsel was a 
"tool" of the State, nor has he shown that counsel's actions 
prejudiced him in any way. 
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We, therefore, summarily affirm the ruling of the district 
court. 
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CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY LEE OLIVER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
Case No. 020908646 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter came before the Court on the State's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for 
summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the petition and its attachments, the State's motion, and 
the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the motion. On 23 March 2004 the Court 
entered a minute entry ruling granting the State's motion and now enters the following findings of 
undisputed fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the petition. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Th»r<j Judicial District 
APR 2 2 2004 
}SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By-
,
 t v) Deputy Cterk 
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FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT 
The Crime 
1. Defendant shot and killed his wife, Deolyn Oliver, with his "repeating-type rifle." 
Information at 2, attached as Exhibit A; Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel & Order 
("Plea AS.") at 2, attached as Exhibit B; Tr. of 11/10/94 Plea Hearing ("Plea Hrng. Tr.") at 6-7, 
attached as Exhibit C.1 
2. The State charged petitioner with one count of murder, a first degree felony. Information 
at 1. 
The Plea Hearing 
3. Petitioner pled guilty as charged. Plea Aff. at 1-7; Plea Hrng. Tr. at 1-11. He entered his 
plea on 10 November 1994. Id 
4. Petitioner executed a plea affidavit in which he acknowledged that he understood the 
rights he would waive by pleading guilty, the nature and elements of the offense, and the minimum 
and maximum sentence. Plea Aff. at 1-7. 
5. The affidavit also explained the plea agreement, which required the State to "recommend 
as a maximum that [petitioner] serve no more than 1-15 y[ea]rs with a firearms enhancement or in 
the alternative will not pursue a firearms enhancement should the defendant be committed for 5-life." 
Plea Aff. at 4. 
6. Regarding petitioner's right to appeal, the plea affidavit stated: 
1
 The exhibits referred to are attached to the State's memorandum supporting its motion. 
2 
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I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury 
or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the 
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could 
not afford to pay the cost for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
PleaAff. at 4. 
7. Petitioner declared his understanding that "if I desire to withdraw my plea of guilty I must 
do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea." Plea Aff. at 5. 
8. Petitioner also stated in his affidavit that he was "not presently under the influence of any 
drug, medication or intoxicants which impair [his] judgment" and he "believe[d] [him]self to be of 
sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the consequences 
of [his] plea and free of any mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent [him] from 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering [his] plea." Plea Aff. at 5. 
9. His trial counsel, Mr. Gilbert Athay, also certified that he believed petitioner was 
"mentally and physically competent." Plea Aff. at 6. 
10. During the plea hearing petitioner assured the Court that he had read the plea affidavit 
and reviewed his constitutional rights with Mr. Athay. Plea Hrng. Tr. at 2-3. Petitioner signed the 
plea affidavit in open court. Id. at 4. 
11. The Court also conducted a thorough colloquy with petitioner, reviewing petitioner's 
rights, the elements of the offense, and the minimum and maximum sentence. Plea Hrng. Tr. at 2-
10. 
12. Petitioner responded directly, coherently, and cogently to each of the Court's questions. 
Id 
3 
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13. None of petitioner's answers during the plea colloquy evidenced confusion or lack of 
comprehension. Id 
14. The Court informed petitioner that "if [he] were convicted at. . . trial [he] would have 
the right to appeal that conviction." Plea Hrng. Tr. at 3. 
15. The Court also informed petitioner that any sentencing recommendations were not 
binding: 
[THE COURT]: Now, I understand that certain recommendations with regard 
to that sentence may be made to the court. You understand that the court is not bound 
by those recommendations? 
[PETITIONER]: Yes, sir. 
[THE COURT]: May be a recommendation that you serve a maximum of not 
more than one to fifteen years, with a firearm enhancement rather than a five to life. 
But you understand that the court is not bound by that recommendation? 
[PETITIONER]: Yes. 
[THE COURT]: That all options are open to the court in that the court impose 
by virtue of your plea here today, a penalty of five to life; do you understand that? 
[PETITIONER]: Yes. 
[THE COURT]: And no promises have been made to you as to what sentence 
this court is going to impose? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
Plea Hrng. Tr. at 4-5. 
16. The Court also inquired about petitioner's mental and physical state: 
[THE COURT]: Are you presently under the influence of any alcohol or 
drugs of any kind? 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[PETITIONER]: No, sir. 
[THE COURT]: Have you taken anything in the last twenty-four hours? 
[PETITIONER]: Only some pills over in the jail - telpolin — 
[THE COURT]: What is the — 
[PETITIONER]: To help me sleep. 
MR ATHAY: They affect your ability to think? 
[PETITIONER]: I don't think so. 
[MR. ATHAY]: They affect you ability to make decisions? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
[MR. ATHAY]: Do you understand what we're doing here today? 
[PETITIONER]: Yeah. Yeah. 
MR. ATHAY: You and I have spoken about this plea on numerous occasions, 
have we not? 
[PETITIONER]: Uh-huh. 
[MR. ATHAY]: And at any time have the pills affected your judgment in 
deciding whether to enter this plea? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you were under the influence of these pills 
right now? You can understand what it is that I have told you? 
[PETITIONER]: No, I understand. I understand. 
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MR. ATHAY: May I ask a couple of other questions? 
THE COURT: Yes, uh-huh-
MR. ATHAY: They give you these to control mood swings that you have? 
MR. OLIVER: I guess that's - 1 told them I couldn't sleep so they gave me 
that stuff. I was depressed. 
[MR. ATHAY]: That been as a rule what occurred in this case? 
[PETITIONER]: Yeah. 
[MR. ATHAY]: And the depression and lack of sleep not something you 
were concerned about prior to this event occur[r]ing? 
[PETITIONER]: No. 
[MR. ATHAY]: And those pills were given to alter the moods that you had 
found yourself in; is that correct? 
[PETITIONER]: Yes. 
PleaHrng. Tr. at 9-10. 
17. Following the above exchange the Court accepted petitioner's plea stating: 
Very well. Then the court finds that the plea has been freely, voluntarily and 
knowingly entered. The court makes that finding based on the defendants' responses 
to the court's questions and observations of the defendant. And I will sign this 
statement so indicating my finding. 
PleaHrng. Tr. at 10. 
18. The Court also informed petitioner that if he desired to withdraw his guilty plea he "must 
make that request within thirty days." Plea Hrng. Tr. at 10. 
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Sentencing 
19. Prior to sentencing, a presentence investigation report ("PSI") was prepared. Presentence 
Investigation Report, filed under seal in Case No. 941901063. 
20. The PSI states that "there was no plea bargain in this case; the defendant pled guilty as 
charged to the offense of Murder, a First Degree Felony." PSI at 2. 
21. The PSI also contains the following statement from the prosecutor, Kent Morgan: 
Mr. Kent Morgan, District Attorney's Office, recommends the defendant be 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He stated, "The term should be no less than 1-
15 years along with a consecutive firearms enhancement of five years, or a period of 5 
years to life." 
PSI at 7. 
22. Mr. Athay wrote a letter to the Court prior to sentencing. Letter dated 1/18/95 to the 
Court from D. Gilbert Athay, attached as Exhibit D. In the letter Mr. Athay stated his belief that 
petitioner's crime fell under the definition of manslaughter. Id. at 3. He also stated: 
It is my considered judgment that Mr. Oliver should be sentenced as a second degree 
felony and I join with Mr. Kent Morgan of the District Attorney's office in 
recommending that the court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose a sentence of 
1-15 years with a consecutive firearms enhancement of 5 years. 
Id. 
23. At sentencing the Court heard from the victim's sister and mother. Tr. of 1/20/95 
Sentencing ("Sentencing Tr.") at 2-7, attached as Exhibit E. 
24. Thereafter, the prosecutor, Mr. Morgan, made a brief statement to the Court: 
Your Honor, I don't think I can add anything to the feelings of loss or the manner in 
which the death was carried out in this case. I think the Courts' decision in this case 
is rather straight forward, is that Gary Oliver should be committed to the Utah State Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Prison forthwith. The question is, for how long? If the court is going to consider a 
420, certainly recommend the Firearm Enhancement certainly be applied. Thank you, 
your Honor. 
Sentencing Tr. at 7. 
25. Mr. Athay argued that petitioner's crime "falls clearly within the one to fifteen year 
sentence as described by the statute; where the killing occurs as a result of a substantial emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation." Sentencing Tr. at 11. 
26. Mr. Athay also stated: 
Mr. Morgan has indicated that on behalf of the State they certainly have no objection 
to that sentence being imposed with the gun enhancement and I think that is 
appropriate also. So at this time we would urge the court to impose a one to fifteen 
year sentence pursuant to the statute and impose the five year gun enhancement and 
we'll submit it. 
Sentencing Tr. at 11. 
27. Mr. Morgan responded: 
[W]hile we're not objecting or recommending we know that there are two alternatives 
the court can consider and it is a matter of practicality he be committed to the Utah 
State Prison and that he does one to fifteen with a gun enhancement [or] he get five to 
life. He'll get out at the same time; therefore that is our recommendation to the court. 
Sentencing Tr. at 12. 
28. After hearing from all concerned, the Court discussed the motion to reduce the level of 
the offense pursuant to section 76-3-402. It stated: 
Well, the court as you know is able to sentence in matter such as this to one 
degree lower. The statute allows the court to do that; again, the court has to look at 
the nature of the case, the circumstances of the offense and the history and character 
of the defendant. And if, after doing that, the court feels that it would be unduly harsh 
to impose the higher penalty, then the court may impose a sentence one degree lower. 
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The court knew beforehand that this motion was going to be made to sentence 
one degree lower, so the court has very carefully gone through the record, at least that 
has been submitted to the court . . . 
Sentencing Tr. at 12-13. The Court then listed the "numerous letters" it had received. Id. at 13. The 
Court also stated that neither petitioner's drinking, nor his anger at the time of the murder "justify 
sentencing one degree lower." Id. The Court continued: 
The court is of the opinion, that just simply cannot, going through this record 
carefully, determine based on all of these circumstances, including the history of the 
defendant who has served time a couple of times in prison, can the court find that it 
would be unduly harsh to sentence to the recommended five to life. 
Id 
29. The Court sentenced petitioner to five years-to-life, and did not impose a firearms 
enhancement. Judgment, Sentence, Commitment at 1, attached as Exhibit F. The Court also granted 
petitioner credit for time served. Id. 
30. Sentence was entered 20 January 1995. Id. 
The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
31. On 3 September 2002 petitioner filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. Pet. at 1. 
32. Petitioner alleged that: 
a) his plea was invalidly entered because he was under the effects of 
Nortriptaline, a psychotropic drug, which left him "in a stupor" and he "did 
not comprehend the nature of the proceedings, what [he] was doing or what 
was transpiring"; 
b) he was denied his right to appeal because neither his attorney nor the Court 
informed him that he "could appeal the sentence if [his] plea was not, in fact, 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made"; 
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c) the State did not fulfil its part of the plea agreement because it failed to: 
(i) make a motion pursuant to section 76-3-402; and 
(ii) present evidence that would support imposition of a one-to-
fifteen year sentence, rather than the five-to-life sentence; 
d) Mr. Athay was ineffective because he: 
(i) did not file a motion to withdraw petitioner's plea within 
thirty days of sentencing but instead "incorrectly" informed 
petitioner that his plea could only be withdrawn within thirty 
days of the date of the plea; 
(ii) did not require the prosecutor to make a motion pursuant to 
section 76-3-402; 
(iii) failed to alert the Court that the plea agreement required 
the State to make a motion pursuant to section 76-3-402; and 
(iv) failed to correct the erroneous statement in the PSI stating 
that there was no plea agreement in this case, or to alert the 
Court that there was a plea bargain in this case. 
Pet. at 7-9. 
33. Petitioner states in his petition that "immediately after my sentencing I informed my 
attorney that I wanted to withdraw my plea and I was informed by my counsel that I could not 
withdraw my plea at that time, and could only have withdrawn my plea within 30 days of changing 
my plea. My attorney did not file a motion to withdraw my plea, even though it would have been 
well within 30 days of the date of sentencing." Pet. at 3. 
34. Petitioner fails to allege any special or unusual circumstance that prevented him from 
timely filing his petition. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The petition is untimely pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (2002). Petitioner's 
conviction became final prior 29 April 1996, which is the effective date of the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. Therefore, petitioner had one year from the effective date of the Act, or until 29 
April 1997, to file his petition. The petition was not filed until 3 September 2002. 
a. The statute of limitations in section 78-35a-107 has not been declared 
unconstitutional. See State v. Frausto, 966 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1998) (a[W]e did not address the 
constitutionality of section 78-35a-107 m Julian"); Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, U 4, 976 P.2d 
100 ("no court has yet actually declared the statute of limitations set forth in section 78-3 5a-107 
unconstitutional"). Therefore, this Court may properly apply section 78-35a-107 to this case. 
b. Petitioner fails to allege, let alone demonstrate that any special or unusual 
circumstance prevented him from timely filing his petition. Petitioner's claim that he could not file 
his petition timely because he lacked the financial resources to retain post-conviction counsel is 
unavailing. Therefore, the "interests of justice" do not excuse his untimely filing. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-35a-107(3). 
2. Although the untimeliness of the petition provides an adequate and independent ground 
upon which to dismiss the petition, the Court also makes the following alternative conclusions 
regarding the merits of each of petitioner's claims. 
a. The record conclusively refutes petitioner's first claim that his plea was invalid 
because he was under the influence of Nortriptaline when he pled guilty. Petitioner was examined 
carefully by both the Court and his attorney with regard to the drug he had recently taken and denied 
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that it affected his ability to comprehend the proceedings. Moreover, the Court found petitioner's 
plea to be validly entered based upon its observations of petitioner at the time of the plea. 
b. Petitioner's second claim, alleging that he was denied his right to appeal, also fails. 
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, he had no right to appeal his sentence on the ground that his plea 
was invalid. Petitioner could not attack the validity of his guilty plea by appealing the legality of his 
sentence. See State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d 630, 631 (Utah 2002). 
c. Petitioner's third claim, alleging that the State did not fulfill its part of the plea 
agreement, also fails as a matter of law. The record conclusively establishes that the State was 
required to recommend at sentencing only that petitioner serve no more than 1-15 years with a 
firearms enhancement, or not pursue a firearms enhancement if petitioner was sentenced to 5-life. 
Plea Aff. at 4. The record confirms that the State made the recommendation and therefore, fulfilled 
its responsibilities under the plea agreement. 
d. Petitioner's fourth claim, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, also fails as a 
matter of law. Petitioner's counsel correctly informed petitioner regarding the deadlines for filing a 
motion to withdraw his plea based upon the law at the time the plea was entered. Under the law then 
in effect, petitioner's request that his counsel file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely 
because it was made more than thirty days after petitioner entered his plea. In any event, petitioner 
cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance in counsel's failure to file a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because, as discussed above, the record conclusively 
demonstrates that petitioner's plea was validly entered. 
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Because the State was not required to make a motion to reduce petitioner's sentence under 
section 76-3-402, petitioner's counsel was not ineffective for failing to require the State to do so, or 
for failing to alert the Court to the failure of the State to make such a motion. Finally, counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to correct the erroneous statement in the PSI that there was no plea 
agreement in this case. The record reflects that the Court was well aware of the plea agreement and 
even if it was not, petitioner received precisely what he bargained for—a sentence of 5-life without a 
firearms enhancement. 
Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
The State's motion to dismiss, or for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. The petition 
is untimely under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
interests of justice should excuse his untimely filing. 
Alternatively, each of petitioner's claims fail as a matter of law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Edwin S. Wall 
Petitioner's Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on §>[ March, 2004 I mailed, postage prepaid, an accurate copy of the 
foregoing proposed ORDER DISMISSING PETITION to: 
Edwin S. Wall 
8 East Broadway, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Addendum C 
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WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD: 
1
 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
I ?he matter before the court this afternoon is the St ate of 
Utah versus Gary Lee Oliver. Is that your correct name, sirj? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel, state your names for the reC-
ord? 
7 I MR. ATHAY: Your Honor, Gilbert Athay appearing on 
8 behalf of Mr. Oliver. 
9 MR. MORGAN: Kerf: Morgan appearing for the state. 
10 I THE COURT: This matter is on the court's calendar 
this afternoon, I have been told, for entry of a plea in thi^ 
12 I matter. 
13 MR. ATHAY: That's correct, your Honor. We would 
14 move the court to permit us to withdraw our plea of not guilty 
15 heretofor entered to the lulormacion charging Murder in the 
16 First Degree and to permit us to enter a new plea of guilty 
17 to that charge. 
18 THE COURT: Very well. Now, Mr. Oliver, have you 
19 reviewed a iatement with your attorney here today? 
20 MR. OLIVER: Yes, sir. 
21 Q. And have you read it yourself? 
22 A. Yes, sir. 
23 Q. This statement lists certain constitutional 
24 rights that you have. Have you reviewed those with your 
25 j attorney? 
A. I have. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Athay, I'll give this to you 
(indicating)
 a n d y o u h a v e r e a d t h o s e yourself? 
MR. OLIVER: Ye*, s ir. 
Q; You understand then, Mr. Oliver, that you're 
entitled to a speedy trial before an impartial jury on this 
charge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you're entitled to present evidence at 
that trial, and for that purpose you can subpoena witnesses 
and you can recruire them to be in attendance, you could taT^ e 
the stand and testify in your own behalf at that trial or 
could remain silent. You could not be forced to testify 
against yourself;you would be entitled to be confronted by 
any witnesses against you that may be presented by the pro-
secution, and through your attorney to cross-examine those 
witnesses, aid to ask them questions. You understand that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If you were convicted at that trial you would 
have the right to appeal that conviction;you understand tha^? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Now, if you plead guilty to this charge, you'13[ 
be giving up all of those rights and there will not be a 
-rial7and you'll not be able to confront witnesses and will 
not be able co ore-e~t evidence. The state will not be re-
quired to present any evidence. And you'll be convicted sirjip 
by your admission and your plea to me here today. ^o you 
mder^tand that o 
3 
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1
 A. Y e s . 
^ J Q. Are you w i l l i n g t o s i g n t h e s t a t e m e n t ? 
^ i A. Yes , I am. 
4
 Q. Would you do so at this time# please? 
5
 J MR. ATHAY: Mr. Oliver has signed the statement 
and Mr. Morgan and I previously signed it. May I approach? 
7
 THE COURT: You may. Mr. Oliver, you are forty-
8
 four years of age? 
9
 J MR. OLIVER: Yes, sir. 
Q. And completed the twelfth grade? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Oliver, this charge that you've been charg) 
ed with is a First Degree Felony and carries a penalty of 
from five years up to a maximum of life in prison. Do you 
1
^ I understand that? 
16
 i A. Yes. 
17
 I Q. It also carries a penalty of up to ten-thousan 
18
 I dollars in fines, plus an 85% surcharge. Are you aware of 
19













Q. Now, I understand that certain recommendation^ 
with regard to that sentence may be made to the court. You 
Yes, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: May be a recommendation that you serv^ 
2
 a maximum of not more than one to fifteen years, with a fire 
3 arm enhancement rather than a five to life. But you under-
4
 stand that the court is not bound by that recommendation? 
5 MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
6 Q. That all options are open to the court in that 
7 the court impose by virtue of your plea here today, a penalt\| 
8 I of five to life;do you understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And no promises have been made to you as to 
what sentence this court is going to impose? 
12
 | A. No. 
13 I Q. The elements of this offense, Mr. Oliver, are J 
14 I that you, as defendant, intentionally, knowingly caused the 
death of another or intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life 
17 I that caused the death. Those are the elements of the offense. 
18
 I In order for you to be found guilty of this offense, the statje 
19 I must prove each one of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt to the jury. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they must reach a verdict of auilty unani-( 
mously. You understand that? i 
A. Ye?, i 
I 
Q. Now, i f you p l e a d g u i l t y t o d ay, however , t h e 
s t a t e w i l l n o t be r e q u i r e d t o make t h a t p r o o f , and you w i l l I 
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1
 I A. Y e s . 









support this charge* And they state that on or about June 
twenty-third, 1994. that you, as the defendant, intentionally 
and knowingly caused the death of Deolyn Oliver or intending 
® to cause serious bodily injury to another committed an act 
' clearly dangerous to human life, that caused the death of 
^ Deolyn Oliver. If you plead guilty today, you'll be admitt-
9 J ing those facts;do you understand that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Now, I want to ask you by way of informing me 
now more about what occurred on this occasion. If you would 
tell the court in your own words what occurred. 
A. We11,your Honor, we were fighting and I was 
1
^ I doin' some drinking. I don't regiember everything that happ-
16
 ' ened. I took a pill that was in the cupboard. Not sure whajb 
17
 I it was and I don't know whether I just blocked it out of my 
18
 I mind—I don't remember -a whole lot of it. I realised what 
*® I happened the next day. 
Q. Which was? 
A. That I shot and killed her. 
22 THE COURT: Ok. I xfnink we have sufficient facts. 
2 3
 Mr. Morgan? 
24 24R. MORGAN: May we approach the bench? 
25 I THE COU?'r5 You may. (Whereupon an off the racord 
discussion was held at sidebar . Mr. Oliver and his 
counsel then conferred off the record at the podiun.'! 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Athay I think that I gave you the | 
2 benefit of the record to ask your client I 
i 
3
 MR. ATHAY: Thank you, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: the facts of what occurred at this 
5 time. 
6 MR. ATHAY: Mr. Oliver, you indicated to the court] 
7 that you and Deolyn had been at the—you took a pill and had 
8 been drinking* Subsequent to that, you did call me on the 
9 telephone;is that correct? 
10 MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
11 Q. And you advised me as to what had occurred;is 
12 that correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And what did you tell me at that time had 
15 occurred? 
16 A. That I had shot my wife and I think she's deadj 
17 Q. And do you remember shooting her? 
18
 A. Sort of, yeah. 
19 I Q. When you say "sort of", tell the court what 
you remember "happening? 
A. Had my repeating-type rifle and shooting my 1 
22 J Q. You remember anything else before coming—were! 
23 I you angry at the time? 
24 I A. Yes. 
25 | O. Did you intend to cause her serious bodily in-
jury when you shor her? 
A. I aueq<5 I mus~ have. 
20 
21 
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Q. Ok. And immediately upon shooting, you realise^ 
that she was dead;is that right? 
A. Yeah. 








I think that's sufficient, your Honor. 
We're satisfied with that fact. 
You satisfied, Mr. Morgan? 
Yes, your Honor. 
All right then. Mr. Oliver, as to 
Count 1, Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree Febny at 209 
East NicolettiDrive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on o$ 
about June 23rd, 1994?as to that charge how do you plead? 
MR. OLIVER: Guilty. 








We do, your Honor. 
Now, are you entering that plea volun-
Yes, I am. 
Nobody is forcing you to do so? 
No. 
Q. And no one has made any promises to you as to 
what the sentence of the court will be"3 
A. No, <?ir. 
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 THE COURT: Are" you presently under the influence 
2
 of any alcohol or.drugs of any kind? 
3 MR. OLIVER: No, sir. 
4
 Q. Have you taken anything in the last twenty-
5 four hours? 
6 A. Only some pills over in the jail—telpolin 
7
 Q. What is the 
8 A. To help me sleep. 
9 MR. ATHAY: They affect your ability to think? 
10
 MR. OLIVER: I don't think so. 
11
 Q. They affect your ability to make decisions? 
12
 A. No. 
^ Q. Do you understand what we're doing here today 
14
 A. Yeah. Yeah. 
**5 Q. You and I have spoken about this plea on num-
16 erous occasions, have we not? 
17
 I A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And at any time have the pills affected your 
judgment in deciding whether to enter this plea? 
A. No. j 
THE COURT: Do you feel like you were under the 
influence of these pills right now? You can understand what 
it is that I have told you? 
MR. OLIVER: No, Z understand. I understand. ; 
Q. Do you have any questions about these proceed-
ings so far, Mr. Oliver? 
A N o . i 
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MR. ATHAY: May I ask a couple of other'questionsf 
THE COURT: Yes, uh-huh-
MR. ATHAYr They give you these to control mood 
swings that you have? 
MR. OLIVER: I guess that's—I told them I could-
n't sleep so they gave me that stuff. I was depressed. 
Q. That been as a rule what occurred in this cas4? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And the depression and lack of sleep not some-f-
thing you were concerned about prior to this event occurinq? 
A. No. 
Q. And that those pills were given to alter the 
moods that ynu had found yourself in?is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. Then the court finds that 
the plea has been freely, voluntarily- and knowingly entered. 
The court makes that finding based on the defendants' responses 
to the court's questions and observations of the defendant. 
And I will sign this statement so indicating my finding. Mr. 
Oliver, if you intend to ask this court to allow you to with-| 
draw this guilty plea, and the court may or may not allow you| 
to do thatybut you must make that request within thirty days. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. The court will enter a 
presentence report in this matter and will set sentencing? 
MRS • JONES; -Tanuarv rixth. 
10 
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THE COURT: January 6th at ten-thirty a.m. Now, 
you have a right, Mr. Oliver, to be sentenced within thirty 
days of todays1 date. I think it may take that long in orde 
for A P and P to get the presentence report completed• 
Your sentencing date is beyond the thirty day period. Are 
you willing to waive that thirty days? 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you discussed that with your attor 
ney? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: You in agreement with that also, Mr. 
Athay? 
MR. ATHAY: I am# your Honor. I think it would be; 
appropriate. 
THE COURT: Very well. Anything else, Gentlemen? 
MR. MORGAN: Ask your Honor, the court to find thajt 
the statement of the defendant is part o£ these proceedings 
and incorporate that as part of the courts' basis for its1 
finding of the plea entered in this case of knowingly and 
voluntarily given. 
THE COURT: Very well, I will do that. I believe 
I indicated that was the finding of the court and signed the 
statement so indicating. 
MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor. j 
THE COURT: That will "be the finding of the court,, 
MR. ATHAY: Thank you, your Honor. May I be excus-
ed? 
in 
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1
 I THE COURT: Yes, you may and court will be in 




6 | SALT LAKE COUNTY) 
ss, 
7 I STATE OP UTAH ) 
(WHEREUPON this hearing was concluded.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on 
November 10th, 1994, I appeared before the above-named 
court and reported the hearing contained in the twelve page^ 
of court transcript herein transcribed, the same being a 
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